Securing the State: From Zionist Ideology to Israeli Statehood

In mid-February 1947, Britain announced that it no longer wished to be responsible for Palestine. The British Mandate, which had existed since 1922, was coming to an end. On 2 April 1947, the question of Palestine was formally handed to the United Nations.[1] The world organization found itself charged with the ungrateful task of finding a solution to the Palestine question by the end of the year, while the British government refused to make any recommendations for how the issue might be resolved. The scene was set for chaos on the ground. Little more than a year later, however, on 14 May 1948, the establishment of the State of Israel would be formally proclaimed, and the new state would receive almost immediate recognition from the world's two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. In just over a year, the Zionist movement had successfully managed the transition from ideological non-state actor to statehood, securing international support for the establishment of the State of Israel on over 50% of the land of former Palestine – a not inconsiderable political achievement.

This article seeks to investigate how the leaders of the Zionist movement worked simultaneously to secure territory for their future state in Palestine, to create "facts on the ground" that favoured their arguments, and to obtain sufficient international support for their state-building project. It is argued that only by investigating the Zionists' state-building activities in terms of a two-pronged approach can one gain an adequate understanding of the Zionist movement's success. Much of the existing literature focuses purely on the USA's role in this dramatic history. So much so that the "history of Truman and Israel" has become almost a genre of its own.[2] This article goes beyond such an approach, arguing that although the USA's role was vital for the creation of the State of Israel, it was in itself not sufficient. This argument is made through a presentation of new insights into the process by which the Zionists garnered support for their project, drawing primarily on archival material from the Jewish Agency.

Covering the period from early 1947 until mid-May 1948, the article also draws on British, Israeli and UN archival material to argue that in order to understand the Zionist movement's many successes in the late 1940s, we need to look at determining factors at both the structural and the individual level. While structural-level factors were important for securing overall support for the Zionists' state-building efforts, in moments of high levels of uncertainty –

what might be called "tipping points" – it was the actions of a handful of key individuals that secured the Zionists' desired outcome.

Structural Backdrop

In order to appreciate the specifics of the developments presented here, it is necessary to understand the modern history not just of Palestine but of the international scene in general. The late 1940s were one of the most decisive and transformative periods of modern history, and the structural changes that took place at that time would considerably influence the way in which the question of Palestine would be addressed.

For one thing, this was an era of decolonization, something that directly affected Palestine. The collapse of the British Empire, along with the end of the Mandate system, meant that a new future was being shaped in the Arab world. Arab nationalism was on the rise, and one after another of the countries surrounding Palestine was gaining independence.[3] This was to be the second wave of self-determination.[4]

In addition, a considerable sense of optimism surrounded the newly established United Nations. This optimism was combined with the sense of responsibility shared by many of the new world body's founders that the UN could not be allowed to fail as its predecessor, the League of Nations, had done – at least not within the area of peace and security.[5] Furthermore, there was a general belief in the UN's ability to "settle" issues.[6] During this period, and in the context of the issue of self-determination, seven new states were granted UN membership – Afghanistan, Iceland, Sweden and Siam (Thailand) in 1946, Pakistan in 1947 and Yemen and Burma in 1948, while another eleven countries applied unsuccessfully for admission.[7] This is worth bearing in mind. On the one hand, it meant that the world was "used to" new states coming into being. In other words, the period was characterized by a certain momentum into which the Zionist project fitted easily. On the other hand, it reveals that self-determination was somewhat *de rigueur* in the period concerned. Thus, in the dispute over Palestine, both parties would advance arguments based on the principle of self-determination, though such arguments technically favoured the Arab Palestinians who, as the majority population by a ratio of two to one, could demand a state of their own under the principle of taking over the pre-existing political unit.[8]

A third structural factor was the dawning of the Cold War. Among other things, this meant that Britain was falling behind as a world power, while the United States and the Soviet Union were becoming increasingly dominant in world affairs – a situation in which the Middle East would prove no exception. As a direct result of the emergence of this new world order, different states would gather into political blocs. As we will see later, from early on the Zionist leadership displayed a remarkably good understanding of the game of bloc politics that was beginning to emerge.

Lastly, the period was deeply marked by the Holocaust that had just ended. This almost inconceivable tragedy loomed like a giant shadow over the world, affecting the situation in Palestine in a variety of ways. For one thing, the Holocaust had turned Zionism into the primary ideology among world Jewry. That said, a number of Jewish organizations remained distinctly non-Zionist in their outlook, most particularly in the USA. Yet, the plight of the Jews still encamped throughout Europe would help to unite and rally these non-Zionist groups to the Zionists' cause.[9] Finally, the Holocaust had created a sense of guilt throughout the Western world.[10] While this may not have been sufficiently great to support massive Jewish immigration into the Western countries themselves, it was large enough to support calls for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.[11]

One should note, however, that beyond these structural issues – elements that often worked in the Zionists' favour – there were a large number of issues that clearly disfavoured the Zionist project: For one thing, not only were Jews outnumbered in Palestine by two to one, but the majority of Jews lived outside the area the Zionists were claiming for their state. Related to this was the fact that Jews owned less than 10% of all land in Palestine. Also, as a non-state actor, the Zionist movement lacked access to official diplomatic channels. The Zionists had no representation in the UN, whereas five Arab states were members of the world organization. These were all adamantly opposed to the Zionist project, as were both Britain and key elements of the US State Department. In other words, when the Zionists began their state-building project, they were waging an uphill struggle.

On the Ground: Building Institutions

Zionist diplomatic efforts conducted around the world in the period 1947–1948 cannot be separated from what was going on in Palestine at this time, and vice versa. On the ground in Palestine, the *Yishuv* (Jewish community in Palestine) had meticulously been building state-like institutions and had been promoting Jewish immigration to Palestine for several decades.[12]

The efforts of the *Yishuv* had led to an increase in Jewish landownership in Palestine from a mere 2% in 1921, to 6% in 1939, and to 8.6% by 1947.[13] This programme of land acquisition was remarkable, especially it took place at a time when there was massive opposition against selling land to Jews.[14] But, as impressive as these efforts were, they did not give sufficient grounds for a claim to the land of Palestine. Jewish ownership still represented less than 10% of the total territory. The situation was similar with regard to Jewish immigration, which had increased dramatically since 1921, when Jews constituted 9.5% of the population of Palestine. Nevertheless, Jews represented no more than one-third of the total population in 1947.[15]

The *Yishuv* was highly organized and could boast a wide range of departments.[16] These included a nascent ministry of foreign affairs, with its own school for diplomats.[17] In terms of state-building on the ground, however, most important was the creation of a separate Jewish economy in Palestine. This was centred around the Histadrut, the Federation of Jewish Labour, which had been founded in 1920. Beyond creating jobs, organizing workers and managing industry, the Histadrut also formed the Haganah, the predecessor to the Israel Defense Forces.[18] As the war of 1947–49 would show, the Haganah rapidly grew into an army in waiting, capable of holding and expanding its area of control. For tactical purposes, it was important for the Jewish Agency to signal that its members were prepared to take matters into their own hands,[19] and that they were ready to set up a state within the agreed boundaries once a UN partition proposal had been approved.[20]

Yet, even though a highly efficient para-state had been built up on the ground in Palestine, one that the US State Department described as "virtually a state at the threshold of birth",[21] support from the world community for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was never a given. And, despite the fact that immigration and land acquisition were on the rise, the physical impact of the Jewish Agency on the ground remained limited. The Zionist state-building project faced considerable opposition. In fact, even hours before the final vote on a

partition of Palestine was to be held in the UN, it seemed that the Zionists might fail to gain the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. How, then, did the Zionist movement succeed in securing the necessary international support for its project?

The International Scene: Garnering Support

Zionist leaders understood early on that if they were to gain the world's support for their project, they would need the help and support of the USA. In addition, by as early as January 1947, the Jewish Agency displayed a clear understanding of the potential offered by the fact that the world's states had begun to organize themselves in terms of political bloc formations. Early in the Zionist movement's efforts, considerable strategic planning went into assessing how to utilize this situation to best advantage. If they could succeed in swaying the US vote, the Zionists were certain that practically the entire Latin American bloc would follow the US lead, while the key to the Scandinavian and Western European countries was Great Britain.[22] By the time it had become clear, however, that Britain would *not* support the Zionist project and that the "Palestine question" would be referred to the UN,[23] David Ben-Gurion quickly framed the challenge his movement faced: "There are many centres of power in the United Nations – the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and others; where should we concentrate our efforts?"[24]

Already at the beginning of 1947, Walter Eytan, the founder of the Zionist 'school for diplomats' and later the first director-general of the Israeli foreign ministry,[25] mapped out a strategy for how the Zionist movement could best influence the various centres of international power. He suggested that the Jewish Agency's focus be split across four key areas: Jerusalem–Cairo, Washington, London and Paris. Jerusalem and Cairo were identified as the main sources of information on the Middle East for diplomats, and it was seen as vital that Zionist activists work to influence this information. Washington was seen as critical in terms of influencing the USA and the Latin American countries. London was seen as vital for "our campaign in Scandinavia and the Low Countries", while the Paris office "should be responsible for France herself as well as countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia."[26]

Eytan analysed the likely stance of various UN members and how the Jewish Agency should approach them. His analysis is telling and highly informative in terms of how the Zionists amassed support for their project: The Arab states were "discount[ed] all together", as were

states such as Afghanistan, India, China, Iran and Turkey – all states with large Muslim populations. Next, the Scandinavian countries and the Benelux states were singled out for a "special effort" aimed at moving them away from the British position, which these countries normally followed, and over to the Zionists' side. The Latin American countries were identified as "numerically the most important single bloc", which thus called for a "very special effort" from the Zionist movement, though most of the Latin American countries were expected to "follow the American line." Lastly, Eytan thought that while there was probably nothing the Zionists could do regarding the British, "the Dominions are by no means hopeless". In addition to South Africa and New Zealand, thought to be the two best bets, Australia and Canada would be pursued rigorously.[27] In many ways Eytan's analysis would provide the blueprint for how the Jewish Agency would work diplomatically throughout 1947 and 1948, and it reveals one of the most efficient tactics employed by the Zionists: When it was possible to use the bloc voting system as an efficient way of securing support, they would approach the relevant bloc leader, while in those cases where a bloc leader was thought likely to vote against the Zionists, they would aim to bypass the bloc structure by approaching bloc members on an individual basis.[28] The only thing that would prove to be off in Eytan's analysis was the fact that he counted the Soviet Union as a certain opponent.

On 2 April 1947, when Britain formally handed over responsibility for the Palestine question to the UN, the Jewish Agency began sending representatives around the world to lobby for its cause, much according to the plan mapped out by Eytan.[29] Two teams were to visit the Western European countries, three groups of representatives were sent to cover Latin America, three groups were to be sent to the British Dominions, and one to each of the two Eastern European countries whose support it was hoped could be secured: Czechoslovakia and Poland.[30] The "hunt" was not just for supporters, but for vocal ones – countries that could be "used" to present the Zionist cause at the UN.[31] Such vocal supporters could help to counter-balance the Arab representation in the UN. As part of their mission to the Western European countries, Abba Eban and Berl Locker were instructed to set up "either a small political committee" or "a liaison officer" with whom the Jewish Agency "could keep in direct contact from here and who will maintain relations with the respective government". In addition, "wherever possible" they should attempt "to establish Christian Pro-Palestine Committees."[32]

Abba Eban would later note the importance of these visits to different countries, recalling how "Zionist envoys would divide the map of the world and go out and seek the support of governments whose votes would become crucial."[33] In Europe, the Zionists visited Belgium, Holland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway.[34] These efforts to win over the smaller Western European countries represented an attempt to undermine – or at least bypass – Britain's traditional dominance. A similar approach was applied to the countries of the British Commonwealth. In some cases, as with Jan C. Smuts, prime minister of South Africa, the Zionist movement was able to appeal personally to heads of state for support in the UN debate. Jan Smuts was both a friend of Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann and an ardent Zionist himself,[35] and he was therefore asked to use his influence over other state leaders within the Commonwealth.[36] South Africa's UN representative was also asked to take a clear pro-partition stance and to make use of South Africa's influence in relation to the other countries of the Commonwealth.[37] Canada, it was believed, could step out of line with Britain and use its influence towards the other Commonwealth countries owing to its "growing prestige in the United Nations" and its close friendship with the United States.[38] In Australia, however, Michael Comay of the Jewish Agency had little success with the Australian premier, though he did succeed in securing expressions of support for the idea of a "liberal partition" in a meeting with Foreign Minister Herbert Evatt.[39]

Although much of the campaign focused on the Zionists' readiness for statehood, an important part of the Zionist campaign also involved delegitimizing the Arabs. It was believed that discrediting Arab policies within the UN sphere would "lay the ground-work" for subsequent Zionist diplomatic efforts.[40] It was therefore decided that material that cast slurs on the Arabs for "their internal weakness, backwardness, ignorance, feudalism, discrimination against minorities, and the situation of the Jews there" should be distributed by a range of Jewish organizations, though not by the Jewish Agency itself – most probably to disguise the fact that such material was an attempt by one involved party to defame the other.[41] In this material, the "intransigence" of the Arabs and Mufti Hajj Amin al-Husseini's ties with the Nazi regime during World War II were stressed.[42] The Mufti himself was described as "a feudal, theocratic tyrant."[43] One of the motivations behind this defamatory campaign was to make it possible for the Zionist movement to claim to be *the* rational voice in Palestine within the international arena.[44] A similar

strategy would also prove useful for the Zionists later on, when the Jewish Agency was able to present the Jewish "yes" to partition as a compromise, while ensuring that the Arab's stance to the partition proposals was viewed as war-mongering and uncompromising.

Creation of UNSCOP and Establishing the Terms of Reference

On 28 April 1947, the UN called a Special Session to discuss the issue of Palestine. The chief outcome of this meeting would be the establishment of a fact-finding mission, the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which would travel to Palestine to investigate the issue further before making its recommendations to the UN General Assembly by 1 September. The first major political battle in this Special Session revolved around the "terms of reference" under which Palestine was to be handled by the UN. While on the surface this seemed like a simple matter of procedure, the outcome of the discussion would have substantial consequences for the parties involved.

On 5 May, a resolution was passed that formally invited the Jewish Agency to the General Assembly to present its case.[45] The importance of this development should not be underestimated. As the UN was beginning its treatment of the Palestine question, Jewish leaders regarded it as vital that they were able to participate and influence the process as it developed. Members of the Jewish Agency understood the importance of appearing in front of the Committee with a united Jewish voice and therefore took pains to ensure that it would be the Agency alone, and no other Jewish organization, that would represent the Jewish point of view at the Special Session.[46] Jewish leaders in the USA also agreed to coordinate their contacts with the US government, so that the same arguments would be presented in different meetings with different US State Department personnel.[47]

From a Zionist perspective, the first victory with regard to the terms of reference in the Special Session was the rejection of a proposed reference to "independence of the "population"",[48] which would have favoured the Palestinian Arabs, who made up the majority population on the ground. A second Zionist victory came in the form of a potential expansion of the terms of reference to include the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe.[49] Although the final UN text makes no specific reference to the plight of Jewish displaced persons, the possibility of their inclusion is not ruled out, leaving the decision up to UNSCOP.[50] A third

triumph for the Zionists was the fact that the final text made no reference to "interested states", a formulation to which the Zionist movement was adamantly opposed because the phrase clearly referred to the Arab states.[51]

In addition to the terms of reference, another main issue during the Special Session was the composition of UNSCOP. One of the key tactical goals of the Jewish Agency was to avoid having Arab representatives on the Special Committee, a point that was stressed throughout the proceedings.[52] In general, the Zionists attached considerable importance to having states sympathetic to their cause on this Committee. And, in their efforts to influence the selection process, they were able to draw on the support of UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie.[53] According to Loy Henderson, head of the US State Department's Near Eastern Affairs Bureau, the Jewish Agency worked actively to influence the choice of certain countries, Guatemala being one of their favourites.[54] In the end, neither Britain nor any of the Arab states were represented on the Committee, but Guatemala was. And, as soon as the member-states of UNSCOP had been announced – Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia – the Jewish Agency shifted its attention to efforts to influence the decisions of the various countries regarding which individuals they would place on the Committee.[55]

The many successes the Zionists enjoyed in this Special Session may seem simply procedural – questions of Jewish Agency representation, terms of reference and the composition of the Special Committee – but they had considerable substantial importance. Furthermore, although each of the victories may have seemed minor in itself, taken together they created a systematic advantage for the Zionist movement that would be consolidated, built on and utilized in subsequent stages of the Zionist campaign.

One of the greatest surprises of the Special Session was the declaration by the Soviet Union's UN representative, Andrey Gromyko, that Russia was willing to support partition.[56] This was a massive blow to the Arabs, who had counted on support from the Soviet bloc.[57] It also meant that one of the major political blocs that the Zionists had placed in the definitive 'no' column was suddenly located safely within the Zionist fold. From this point on, the Jewish Agency could concentrate its efforts on securing US support.[58]

In addition to the procedural victories of the Special Session, Jewish Agency representatives won considerable diplomatic terrain by presenting themselves as moderates in comparison to the Arab delegates.[59] A case in point turns on how the Arab states responded to the outcome of the Special Session. After losing the battle over the terms of reference, the Arabs decided to boycott all subsequent UNSCOP hearings. This would turn out to be a huge tactical error, ultimately giving the Zionist movement one of its greatest advantages.[60]

UNSCOP

The benefits provided by the seemingly small victories in the Special Session, along with the Arab decision to boycott UNSCOP, soon became evident once the Committee started its work. The Zionists promptly followed up on their efforts in the General Assembly by arranging for David Ben-Gurion to send the Committee a personal welcome note, in which he promised its members all the help they might want. Attached to the welcome letter were 30 copies of *The Jewish Case,* an anthology of the material that had been given by the Jewish Agency to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 1946.[61] And, in the subsequent period, the Jewish Agency continued to be play an active part in the Commission's work. During UNSCOP's stay in Palestine, the Agency reached out to its members personally, inviting them into their homes and engaging in discussions that could last for hours.[62] Particular and personal attention was paid to members of the commission that were seen as being able to "sway the balance".[63] Included in this work was the provision of guided tours to the camps that had been set up in Palestine for Jewish displaced persons from Europe, where Committee members could interview Holocaust survivors.[64] In all ways, the apparatus of the Jewish Agency was superior to that of the Arabs. The Arab side was also quickly losing ground internationally on account of its decision to boycott UNSCOP's work.[65] The Jewish Agency further increased its advantages by wiretapping the rooms of the Committee members, and was thus able to obtain continually updated information about the Committee's internal discussions.[66] In addition, the Agency also arranged matters so that the Committee's members would meet Jews in Palestine who spoke and presented the Jewish case in the Committee members' respective languages.[67]

By mid-July, the Zionists could see some of the fruits of their extensive labour: It was beginning to be clear that a majority of the UNSCOP team favoured a partition of Palestine.[68]

Considering that the Zionists owned only 10% of the land at this point, this was a significant achievement. Nevertheless, it remained uncertain whether the Committee's final recommendation would go in the Zionists' favour, or whether such a recommendation would be able to secure sufficient support within the UN General Assembly. According to Henri Vigier, an experienced French diplomat on the UNSCOP Secretariat, a recommendation to partition Palestine could only possibly gain the support of the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly if UNSCOP's final report expressed overwhelming support for such a solution. Nothing less would carry enough moral weight to convince the General Assembly. As Vigier saw it, however, this was a highly unlikely scenario. Those UNSCOP members who would express support for partition, he forecast, "would probably be a small majority, possibly not more than six – the other five not voting solidly in favor of some alternative but splitting among a number of alternatives".[69]

After UNSCOP had finished its visit to Palestine towards the end of July, the Committee continued its work in Geneva. Here, too, the Zionists – led by Abba Eban and David Horowitz – continued their lobbying efforts. As Abba Eban would later recall of those intensive days: "We could hardly catch our breath. On and on we went, expounding, arguing, persuading, in every corridor, restaurant and hotel suite to which we could gain admission by charm or persistence or stealth."[70] In Geneva, Jewish Agency members directed considerable energy into their efforts to convince UNSCOP to visit the camps that had been set up for Jewish displaced persons in Europe.[71] A vote was called on the issue and – with six Committee members voting in favour of the motion, four against, and one abstaining – a decision was made that UNSCOP would visit the camps.[72] The Jewish Agency then took steps to ensure that UNSCOP would meet actual displaced persons themselves, and not just their elected representatives.[73] After a visit to one such camp, it was reported that "[m]embers [of UNSCOP were] very impressed of bad conditions and of unbent will of refugees to reach Palestine."[74] Jewish Agency leader Moshe Shertok's conclusion was straightforward: "Visit camps singular success."[75]

As scheduled, UNSCOP finalized its proposals on 31 August. As its members proved unable to agree on one joint proposal, two were put forth. The first, the majority proposal, favoured the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, with Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* under UN control. This approach was supported by eight members of the committee.

The minority proposal, favoured by the remaining three members, called for the creation of a single federative state, with Jerusalem as its capital.[76] The question that remained was whether the majority proposal would be able to carry the necessary two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.

After UNSCOP: Gathering Support

The Zionist leadership realized that if the Committee's recommendations were to receive an affirmative vote in the General Assembly, it would be necessary for the Jewish Agency to portray partition not as a victory for the Zionist movement, but rather as a *concession*. The picture that was painted was therefore of a Zionist movement that had high levels of respect for the UN and was willing to make compromises.[77] That the Zionists were able to successfully present the partition of Palestine as a concession on their part is indeed rather impressive. In effect, partition would grant one-third of the population over 50% of the land, when that same population actually possessed less than 10% at the time. Indeed, the majority proposal so favoured the Zionists that a British diplomat commented: "we cannot reconcile [it] with our conscience".[78] For historian Walid Khalidi, this idea that the Zionist movement "accepted" partition is simply part of the victor's narrative of the historical events that were unfolding. Khalidi maintains that what the Zionists in fact did was nothing more than "accepting" what was in reality "their own demand". "It is difficult", he declares, "to see why a moral kudos appertains to the party that accepts its own program".[79]

In a new estimate of potential UN votes carried out by the Jewish Agency on 9 September 1947, 11 countries were listed as definitely voting no, 7 as possibly voting no, and 7 as needing to be watched. If 20 countries voted against, the majority proposal would fail.[80] The estimate thus emphasized that that every single vote counted, and that all available methods of "persuasion" should therefore be employed. Among the countries targeted by the Jewish Agency was thus France, which was thought to be able to carry with it the votes of the Benelux countries.[81] However, once it became clear that, for example, Luxembourg was free to vote as it saw fit, the Jewish Agency turned its attention directly to Luxembourg's foreign ministry.[82] In addition to these Western European countries, considerable attention was directed at the Vatican,

which, though having no vote itself, was important for the Catholic vote in the Latin American bloc as well as in other Catholic countries.[83]

With regards to the British Commonwealth, the conclusion drawn was the opposite of that for the Soviet bloc: Britain would not support partition, but all the other countries in its dominions would, with the exception of India and Pakistan.[84] In some cases, such as that of Canada, the stance taken by individual Commonwealth countries would ultimately take Britain by surprise.[85] The Zionists thus proved successful in their efforts to undermine the second of the three major blocs, and the individual votes of most Commonwealth countries seemed secure.

The Battle for US Support

While the Zionists had succeeded in securing the Eastern bloc and in breaking the British-led bloc with regard to the individual Western European countries, the final and most important bloc – led by the USA – remained uncertain.[86] Within the US foreign policy establishment, there was considerable internal disagreement regarding US policy on the question of Palestine. So, although reports began to surface in late September that the US State Department would support the majority proposal, the Zionist leadership was not convinced that US support was sufficiently secure.[87] A call was therefore sent out, in early October 1947, to all the local branches of the American Zionist Emergency Council, urging all members to

> call upon your community, Jews and non-Jews, to send as many wires and letters as possible to both President Truman and Secretary of State Marshall expressing the widespread feeling of concern over reports that our government is unwilling to take an unequivocal stand with the U.N. in favor of the majority report.[88]

In this effort, everybody who could lend a hand was welcome, even those that were not ideologically fully on board with the aims of the Zionist movement. In the consultations among the various US Jewish organizations and the Jewish Agency, a main aim was to clarify the complicated nature of the US organizational structure dealing with the issue of partition. This was essential for ensuring that the Zionists were able to address the right person at the right time and to determine which outside influence would be most effective in terms of promoting their message to the US administration. Leading this work was Moshe Shertok (Sharett) and Rabbi

Silver, who were assisted in their efforts by the American Executive of the Jewish Agency and a professional staff.[89]

The Zionists understood that the two individuals that were key to securing US support were President Harry Truman and his secretary of state, General George C. Marshall.[90] Truman's support, the Zionists had been warned, would have to be secured to such a degree that the president would "stick to this thing" and not "drop it" at the first sign of strong opposition, as was allegedly his way.[91] The pro-Zionist pressure Truman came under has been the theme of much research, and no attempt will be made here to uncover its full extent. That said, it is necessary to note a couple of factors that particularly influenced Truman's decision to back the Zionist project in the Middle East. First, with the exception of the State Department, there was no pro-Arab counter-pressure in the USA. As Truman put it: "I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism: I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."[92] This leads to the second point: The Zionist cause enjoyed wide support among the US public. A look at the 1948 archives of two important newspapers – the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post* – shows that their op-eds had a pro-Zionist: pro-Arab ratio of 31:0 and 18:1, respectively. Among the general public, two-thirds were in favour of partition.[93] Added to this was the issue of important swing states, such as New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois and Ohio, where Jews represented a large and politically active minority that could swing elections.[94] Given these factors, it is clear that Zionism's supporters within the Truman administration, as well as the Zionist lobby groups, were working in fertile ground.

In addition, Truman's Palestine policy was influenced by the ongoing split between the president and his State Department, which was under the leadership of George Marshall.[95] Marshall was negative towards partition, while Truman, "[f]ollowing intervention [from] many quarters [in] Washington [...] evidently [...] gave private assurances [that he] would support [the] majority plans general lines."[96] Through its UN ambassador Herschel V. Johnson, the USA made it clear that "the United States was not going to twist anybody's arm for a vote and would not bludgeon anyone to vote the American way."[97] The reality, however, would turn out somewhat differently.

Every Vote Counts

By mid-October, the Jewish Agency was estimating that the race for votes within the General Assembly would be a "tight squeeze". In addition, "while there is no doubt that our position has improved tremendously in the last six months", Comay reported, "there are extremely formidable hurdles still ahead."[98] Before UNSCOP's proposals could go to the General Assembly, it was decided that two UN subcommittees would be set up, tasked with looking further into the two approaches proposed by UNSCOP. A brief look at the makeup of these committees indicates that they were favourable to the Zionists. In theory, the subcommittees had been set up to study the two proposals in the hope that it might be possible to identify a compromise solution. In practice, however, the way in which the subcommittees were set up clearly favoured the majority proposal: partition.[99] The subcommittee that would look into the majority proposal was composed of "friends and sympathizers of the Zionist cause", while the second subcommittee (anti-partition) was seen as unlikely to agree on any plan that might receive UN support,[100] and consisted of Afghanistan, Colombia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen.[101]

Once again, the Zionists were achieving small victories within the field of formalities that gave them real advantages in the field of substance. The Zionists successfully built on each victory achieved – the moral weight of the majority proposal was carried into the composition of the subcommittees, thus adding both to the likelihood that the majority proposal would stand and to the weight it would carry once it stood. This ability to build on each successive victory gave the Zionist movement a degree of momentum that its opponents would be unable to match.

Walter Eytan concluded that the two main diplomatic focuses for the Zionists should be "(a) To work on the members of the partition sub-committee; and (b) to influence the waverers to join our side."[102] A list of countries demanding special attention was drawn up: Belgium, China, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Iceland, Liberia, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Philippines, Siam and Sweden. Separate instructions were circulated for how to approach each of these countries.[103] The countries of Western Europe dominated the list of swing countries.

The lines of argument used by the Jewish Agency towards Belgium provide a good example of the strategy adopted towards individual states in general. In a letter to two influential Belgians, dated 22 October 1947, it was argued that Belgium should support the proposal for

partition both for moral/historical reasons and because the proposal was supported by a large body of nations. The appeal for support was directed not to the Belgian government as such but rather to influential "friends", who were asked to appeal to their government.[104] Such a line of approach seemed to have some success and was therefore pursued through various channels.[105] For instance, this twin use of moral arguments combined with the argument that "everybody else is supporting partition" would also be used towards Denmark.[106]

Equally illustrative of the vote-gathering techniques employed at this time is the approach adopted towards the Netherlands. Once the Zionists learned that the Dutch government would vote for the majority proposal, but did not wish to be seen as a vocal supporter of partition, it was decided that no further visits would be made to the Netherlands unless a change in direction was signalled.[107] This is a good example of the focus and the strategy of the Jewish Agency: all effort would channelled where it was most needed, with little or no energy being wasted on states that already had made and signalled their decision.[108]

In addition to the moral argument that was used towards the Western European countries, as exemplified in the letter to the Belgians discussed earlier, the Zionists repeatedly used an argument that rested on the prestige of the UN as a world body. As the final UN vote approached and the Jewish Agency's efforts towards the USA intensified, this line of argument was used in a meeting with Dean Rusk of the US State Department, when it was argued that if the majority proposal failed to gain a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly,

> this would be a setback first of all for the United States herself; she would have failed in
> something to which she was seriously setting her hand; her own prestige would be at stake.
> Moreover, the United Nations would become a farce if it failed to carry through a project
> which was so near a settlement. If the United States really believed in the United Nations,
> she would not permit that to occur.[109]

In a sense, the Zionists held up their quest for sovereignty as a test case for the UN. The UN's prestige hinged on whether or not the Zionist movement obtained support for their independence, the argument went. Since many of the UN member-states, particularly the USA, felt a particular responsibility towards the UN and its future, it seems reasonable to think that this line of argument had a strong resonance throughout the international community at the time.[110] And, in

their claim that partition represented a vital test case for the UN, the Zionists had a staunch ally in UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, who used the argument often.[111]

The examples above illustrate the carefully tailored and targeted way in which the Zionists approached various states, as well as the range of different arguments that they used to promote their case towards those states. The examples of Belgium and Denmark show how arguments were carefully tailored for smaller countries, for whom the fact that most of the more influential countries supported partition was sure to have resonance. Meanwhile, the US example shows how the Zionists appealed to the USA's sense of global responsibility, putting the prestige of the UN on the line, while the Dutch example illustrates how the Zionists avoided wasting diplomatic energy on countries that were regarded as secure.

Ad Hoc Vote and Thanksgiving Respite
Before the Partition Plan could proceed to the General Assembly, however, it had to pass through a vote in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on 24 November. Here, though the proposals received the simple majority support (25 for, 13 against, 17 abstentions and 2 absent) they needed in order to proceed further, they failed to achieve the two-thirds majority that would be required for approval by the General Assembly. The General Assembly vote on the partition plan was initially scheduled for 26 November, but was delayed until 29 November owing to a combination of filibustering, a Thanksgiving break and a French suggestion that the vote be postponed for a further day.[112] The last two days would witness the most intense vote-collecting activities of the entire campaign.

In an attempt to garner sorely needed votes, Weizmann sent a personal letter to President Truman, requesting the USA's *active* support to help secure the countries that were "closely associated with U.S. general policy".[113] The same author sent a second letter to Truman on the same day, stressing the same points,[114] while a third letter followed on 28 November. In his third letter, Weizmann stressed, *inter alia*, that Truman need not fear that the Jewish state would be a bastion of communism.[115] Weizmann also sent similar personal appeals to representatives of the Netherlands, who had surprisingly abstained in the Ad Hoc Committee vote and thus required renewed attention. Here, one of the main arguments was related to the prestige of the UN.[116] By 27 November, it was clear that the Netherlands, New Zealand and Belgium were securely in the "yes" camp. The same was thought to be true for France and Luxembourg.[117]

Weizmann's letters to Truman must have had an impact: although the official US policy had been to not push countries to vote one way or another, the exact opposite took place.[118] In these last crucial days before the scheduled vote, the Zionists were greatly helped by sympathizers within the White House. According to Loy Henderson, "[White House aide] David Niles called us here a couple of days ago and said that the President had instructed him to tell us that, by God, he wanted us to get busy and get all the votes that we possibly could; that there would be hell if the voting went the wrong way."[119] As Clark Clifford recalled of this last Thanksgiving effort, he was personally concerned that the partition vote "might not go through". Clifford therefore talked with representatives from other states. "We went for it," Clifford stated, attributing the fact that partition "went through" to the efforts of the White House, adding: "I kept the ramrod up the State Department's butt".[120]

What transpired was basically coercion and blackmail that succeeding in swaying the necessary amount of countries from the "no" or abstention camps into the "yes" camp.[121] Direct Zionist pressure was applied on Haiti, Liberia, the Philippines, China, Ethiopia and Greece. These had all indicated that they would vote against partition; with the exception of Greece, however, all six subsequently voted for the proposal or abstained.[122] In the case of the Philippines, this change came about because two members of the US Supreme Court, ten US Senators and presidential advisor Clark Clifford all requested that the Philippines vote for partition, making reference to the good relationship that currently existed between the two states.[123] Liberia changed its vote because of threats that its rubber exports to the USA would be boycotted if Liberia voted against the proposal. For the Liberian economy, which was largely based on rubber, this trade was vital. Liberia's stance thus became pro-partition.[124] Details of the events that transpired during this Thanksgiving respite clearly reveal this to be one of the main "tipping points" of this history. A successful Zionist outcome was ensured through the efforts of a handful of key Zionist actors, either from the Jewish Agency or – as in the case of David Niles and Clark Clifford – from within the US White House itself.

Partition Plan

When the final vote was held on 29 November 1947, UN General Assembly Resolution 181 – better known as the UN Partition Plan – was passed with 33 in favour, 13 against, 10 abstentions and 1 absent vote. All the Arab states voted against, while Britain abstained. Paradoxically, since the Jewish side had no vote, this meant that none of the parties directly affected had actually voted for partition. The resolution called for the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state, with greater Jerusalem as a UN-administered *corpus separatum.*[125] Problems arose immediately, however: Since the resolution granted international legitimacy to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, but none of the states that were directly involved – the neighbouring Arab states and Britain – supported partition, the resolution would be nigh impossible to implement peacefully. The dilemma facing the Zionists was also evident: while the Partition Plan gave them a legal justification for their state-building project, it left them with no legal means of accomplishing it. It was, in Ben-Gurion's words, "a moral […] but not yet a practical victory".[126] Several plans were discussed by the international community in the months between November 1947 and May 1948, including proposals for sending a UN peacekeeping force to the region, but nothing came of these discussions.[127] Part of the problem was the emerging Cold War deadlock. Implementation of the Partition Plan would require the deployment of an international force. Yet, Britain had made it clear that all of its troops would be out of Palestine by 14 May, and neither of the two superpowers could send troops without the other also getting involved.[128]

The absence of enforcement provisions in the UN resolution left it to the parties to take matters into their own hands. In the words of historian Avi Shlaim: "The UN vote in favor of partition thus provided not just international legitimacy for creating Jewish and Arab states but, unintentionally, the signal for a savage war between the two communities in Palestine."[129] The period between the partition resolution and the proclamation of the State of Israel would be marked by civil war in Palestine that would turn the Partition Plan's terms into a pipe dream. By the end of the war, which turned interstate on 15 May 1948, Israel would end up controlling over 77% of the total territory, including West Jerusalem, while the approximately 750,000 Palestinians that fled the country would end up as refugees.[130] How would these developments on the ground affect the Zionists' efforts to establish their own state?

The Trusteeship Proposal

In the weeks and months that followed the UN General Assembly's acceptance of the partition resolution, the Americans began to backtrack on their former position. Realizing that partition could not be implemented peacefully, US officials thus started work on the so-called Trusteeship Proposal that would be announced in March 1948.[131]

In effect, the Trusteeship Proposal called for the establishment of a UN trusteeship over all of Palestine. This would mean (at best) postponing independence for both Arabs and Jews. The terms of the Trusteeship Proposal were anathema for the Zionists, who saw themselves as on the very brink of achieving their goal of an independent Jewish state. The Soviet Union was also adamantly opposed to trusteeship because, in its view, this meant a US trusteeship. UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie so adamantly opposed the Trusteeship Proposal that he threatened both US and Soviet UN representatives that he would resign over the issue. Both sides advised against such a step.[132] After the USA called for a second Special Session on Palestine to discuss the proposal, it soon became clear that the Trusteeship proposal would fail to achieve the support of the UN General Assembly.[133] In addition to the opposition it had met from the Soviet Union and the UN Secretary-General himself, the proposal was also completely undermined within the US administration. The day before US Ambassador to the UN Warren Austin announced the Trusteeship Proposal in the UN, President Truman had secretly met with Chaim Weizmann, to whom he promised that the USA would not abandon its former policy. Trusteeship would clearly represent a *volte face*, and Truman, embarrassed at the timing of the events and under heavy pressure owing to the "domestic backlash" created by the announcement of the Trusteeship Proposal, declared that the USA stood by partition, and that trusteeship was only a temporary stop on that path.[134]

One of the things that seems to have influenced the US president most was the thought that the US proposal for trusteeship meant that he had broken his promise to Weizmann: "I assured [him] I would stick to it [partition]. He must think I am a shitass", Truman reportedly commented to Clark Clifford at the White House.[135] To rectify this situation, Truman therefore relayed a personal message to Weizmann that he would stand by his original promise, supporting partition. Then, on 23 April 1948, Truman again relayed another secret message to Weizmann. This time he promised immediate US recognition once the establishment of the Jewish state was

proclaimed. This promise was kept secret, as the administration was not united in its stance on this issue.[136] Accordingly, the Trusteeship Proposal not only was a failure and an embarrassment to all involved in the US administration, but also provided the Zionists with a vital prize.

State Proclaimed, Support Gained

Regardless of the chaos that reigned on the ground, the proclamation of the State of Israel would take place as planned. As previously, the US administration was split with regards to the Jewish state that was about to be proclaimed. Secretary of State Marshall, along with much of the State Department, was worried that recognition would endanger US policy throughout the Middle East, while President Truman and his White House staff supported early recognition. At Truman's behest, during a meeting held in the Oval Office on 12 May 1949, Clifford, on Truman's behest, made the argument for an immediate recognition of Israel, which Truman had already promised Weizmann. Secretary of State George Marshall was furious at what he perceived as a cheap tactic to buy votes, and even threatened to vote against Truman in the next US election. The heated meeting ended with Truman stating that he supported Marshall, but over the next few days it became clear that Truman had no intention of following Marshall's advice. This period was used to prepare for recognition of Israel – as well as to cool Marshall's temper.[137] In effect, the Zionists had won the battle within the US administration. Once it became clear to all that Truman would indeed recognize Israel, Marshall favoured ensuring that this was carried out as quickly as possible – in order to ensure that the Soviet Union did not beat them to it.[138]

The USA thus extended *de facto* recognition of Israel just eleven minutes after the Israeli Declaration of Independence was issued by Ben-Gurion.[139] The speed with which this recognition was issued came as something of a shock to most of the involved parties, including officials at both the US State Department and the British Foreign Office,[140] and throughout the Arab world prompted jokes that a "new aeroplane had been invented which would go so fast that it equalled the speed with which the United States of America recognized the State of Israel."[141] Though both the borders and the demographic situation in Palestine were completely in flux at this time, the official formulation in the application of recognition from Israel to the USA was "within frontiers approved by the General Assembly in the United Nations in its resolution of

November 29, 1947".[142] Truman's response to the application was authored by David Niles and Clark Clifford.[143]

On 18 May 1948, three days after the US recognition, the Soviet Union (Russia, Ukraine and Belarus) extended full *de jure* recognition of Israel. The other communist countries soon followed Moscow's leadership. Czechoslovakia and Poland both extended recognition on 18 May, while Yugoslavia followed on 19 May.[144] Zionism was no longer just an ideology: it had been embodied in an internationally recognized state – Israel.

From the British point of view, early recognition of Israel endangered the possibility of obtaining peace in Palestine. Despite serious attempts, however, British diplomats proved unable to keep the Commonwealth countries in line with this policy. South Africa extended *de facto* recognition of Israel on 24 May 1948.[145] The British government was more successful with New Zealand and Australia, however, who reluctantly postponed recognition owing to British pressure.[146] Both of these countries recognized Israel on 29 January 1949.[147]

By the end of May 1948, twelve countries had recognized Israel. Ten of these recognitions were *de jure*.[148] This would mark the conclusion of the first phase of the project aimed at gaining international recognition of an independent and sovereign Jewish state. The second and subsequent phase of the Zionists' diplomatic battle would be geared toward securing Israeli membership of the United Nations, which would signal the culmination of the Zionist state-building project.

Securing the State

In little more than a year, the Zionist movement had gone from being a nationalist ideological movement to internationally recognized statehood – an astounding political achievement. Walter Eytan would later comment that "to be recognized by the United States was a near-miracle, certainly the greatest thing that could have happened at that moment to the infant state."[149] As we have shown, though, there was nothing miraculous about such a development. While the campaign may have been an uphill struggle, and victory never guaranteed, the Zionists' ultimate success was due to less-than-divine factors: painstakingly and acutely targeted political work. The Jewish Agency skilfully analysed the makeup of the global political arena and used the structures it identified to secure maximal political output for minimal input. At each step of the

process, member of the Agency were thus able to outmanoeuvre their opponents. In the context of the terms of reference for UNSCOP, during UNSCOP's tours, during UN debates, within the various capitals of the world, inside the White House and on the ground in Palestine, the fact of the matter is that the Zionist movement was able to secure victory after victory, and to build on each successive victory to create a massive political momentum. At times, as in the final days before the UN vote on partition, these victories were achieved through the use of unconventional methods. More often than not, however, the Zionists were simply able to outmanoeuvre their opponents politically, consolidating previous gains – whether procedural or substantial – at each step of the process and not wasting their energies either on hopeless issues or in areas where adequate support had already been secured. To summarize, after having secured for itself the right to participate at the first UN Special Session, the Jewish Agency was able to actively voice its opinions and engage in the debate over the "terms of reference" and the composition of UNSCOP. Following these victories, the Zionists were in a position to influence UNSCOP towards favouring partition. The subcommittees set up to discuss UNSCOP's proposals were then utilized to strengthen the argument for partition, and at that point the total sum of UN initiatives was used as an argument for why partition had to be supported.[150]

All along, the Zionists clearly understood that US support would be vital, but not sufficient for achieving their goals. What was both vital *and* sufficient was the rare combination of circumstances whereby *both* superpowers could be counted on for their support while the British Commonwealth could be successfully undermined. These were political advantages that the Arabs, despite having the demographically greatest claim to Palestine, had no chance of matching.

At last-minute "tipping points" – for example, in the last days before the General Assembly vote on partition and in the efforts to undermine the USA's Trusteeship Proposal – a handful of key actors were able to tip the final balance in the Zionists' favour. At these crucial moments, the individual level would thus prove of key importance. However, as this article has also demonstrated, the Zionists were able to draw on key individuals at such critical moments because of the meticulous political groundwork they had carried out in advance. The Jewish Agency fought tooth and nail for every vote and for each procedural issue. It applied pressure only where it was thought to be needed, adopting a more hands-off approach when support was

considered secure. The Zionists built on each successive victory, thus winning their case step by step. Significantly, no achievement, promise or setback was ever treated as being carved in stone. The fact that the UN's Partition Plan failed to satisfy the Jewish Agency in relation to the potential borders of a Jewish state was not seen as a problem. As Ben-Gurion put it: "There will be war and in the course of the war, the borders will be changed",[151] which is indeed what transpired. While the Partition Plan had granted 56% of Palestine to the Jews, by the end of the war Israel controlled 77% of the land. Such an approach touches upon the second part of the state-building equation: the creation of facts on the ground. Internationally sanctioned support was vital, but not adequate for the Zionists efforts.

  While the Zionists were conducting an advanced campaign of international lobbyism, the Palestinians completely lacked the necessary apparatus for such an approach and boycotted the UN hearings. The diplomatic, political and institutional failure of the Palestinians thus provides a negative mirror image of the successes of the Zionist movement. And, when the die was cast at the UN, and the stage was set for war in Palestine, the *Yishuv* would be able to muster an advanced modern army, something that would prove impossible for the Palestinians. Accordingly, as the Zionists successfully made the transition from ideological movement to established statehood, the independent Arab state that was also envisioned in the UN Partition Plan that had proved so crucial for the Zionist project was nowhere to be seen on the political horizon.

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[1] Yuen-li Liang, "The Palestine Commission," *The American Journal of International Law* 42, no. 3 (July 1, 1948): 649.

[2] See e.g. Ronald Radosh and Allis Radosh, *A Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel*, 1st ed. (Harper Perennial, 2010); Michael Joseph Cohen, *Truman and Israel* (Univ of California Pr, 1990); Michael T. Benson, *Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel* (Praeger Publishers, 1997); Zvi Ganin, *Truman, American Jewry and Israel, 1945-1948* (Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1978); Grace Cohen Grossman, Stanley Chyet, and Michael T. Benson, *On Moral Grounds: President Harry S. Truman and the Birth of the State of Israel* (Skirball Cultural Center, 1998); Michael J. Devine, Robert P. Watson, and Robert J. Wolz, *Israel and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman* (Truman State Univ Press, 2008); Ian J. Bickerton, "President Truman's Recognition of Israel," *American Jewish Historical Quarterly* 58 (1968): 173-239; Lawrence Davidson, "Truman the Politician and the Establishment of Israel," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 39, no. 4 (2010): 28-42.

[3] William L Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Fourth Edition, Fourth Edition. (Westview Press, 2008), 193-237.

[4] The first was the post-WWI period, Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination," *The American Journal of International Law* 65, no. 3 (1971): 463.

[5] Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations: The Years of Western Domination 1945-1955* (Palgrave Macmillan, 1982), 3-16.

[6] Ibid., 169.

[7] These were Albania, the Mongolian People's Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Ireland, Transjordan, Austria, Finland and Italy. Yuen-Li Liang, "Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations," *The American Journal of International Law* 43, no. 2 (1949): 289.

[8] Population ratio from Victor Kattan, *From Coexistence to Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israel* (Pluto Press, 2009), 151-152; The legal explanation of post-colonial self-determination is from Emerson, "Self-Determination," 463.

[9] Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 109-121; Menahem Kaufman, *An ambiguous partnership: non-Zionists and Zionists in America, 1939-1948* (Wayne State University Press, 1991), 11-13, 195-196, 202.

[10] Baylis Thomas, *How Israel Was Won: A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Lexington Books, 1999), 53-55.

[11] Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945*, 1st ed. (Penguin Press, 2005), 32.

[12] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 239-271; Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001* (Vintage, 2001), 1-180; Tom Segev, *One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate* (Picador, 2001); Arthur Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment: Palestine 1917 - 1949* (Macmillan, 1949).

[13] Jacob Metzer, "Economic Structure and National Goals--The Jewish National Home in Interwar Palestine," *The Journal of Economic History* 38, no. 1 (1978): 106.

[14] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 254-258.

[15] Metzer, "Economic Structure and National Goals--The Jewish National Home in Interwar Palestine," 106.

[16] See complete list of departments in Bonnè to Comay, 19 September 1948, RG93/MFA/181/5, ISA; Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 251.

[17] Moshe Yegar, "Moshe Sharett and the Origins of Israel's Diplomacy," *Israel Studies* 15, no. 3 (2010): 5-7.

[18] Cleveland and Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 253-254; Koestler, *Promise and Fulfilment*, 12.

[19] Minutes of Meeting American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 5 October, 5 October, 1947, Z5/56, CZA; Proceedings: A meeting of the Non-Zionist Organizations and the Jewish Agency - 26 October, 26 October, 1947, Z5/2375, CZA.

[20] Minutes of Meeting, American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 16 May 1947, 16 May 1947, Z5/3509; Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: American Section - 1 October, 1 October 1947, Z5/2369, CZA.

[21] Quoted in Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (The University of North Carolina Press, 2006), 36.

[22] Memorandum by N. Goldmann, 23 January 1947, doc. 19, Nana Sagi, ed., *Political Documents of The Jewish Agency*, vol. ii (Jerusalem: Publishing House of the World Zionist Organization, 1998), 51.

[23] The UK decision to refer the matter to the UN became increasingly clear throughout the winter of 1947 and was received extremely negatively by the JA. See: D. Ben-Gurion to Paula Ben-Gurion, 8 February 1947, doc. 49, Sagi, PDJA ii:148-150; Minutes of a Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in London, 9 February 1947, doc. 52, Sagi, PDJA ii:152-155; Memorandum by D. Ben-Gurion, 9 February 1947, doc. 53, Sagi, PDJA ii:155-156; Memorandum by D. Ben-Gurion, 9 February 1947, doc. 54, Sagi, PDJA ii:156-159; Memorandum by D. Ben-Gurion, 9 February 1947, doc. 55, Sagi, PDJA ii:159-161; Minutes of a Meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in London, 11 February 1947, doc. 58, Sagi, PDJA ii ii:164-165; Minutes of meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive in London, 11 February 1947, doc. 59, Sagi, PDJA ii:165-167; Meeting: E. Bevin and others - Members of the Jewish Agency Executive (London, 10 February 1947), 12 February 1947, doc. 60, Sagi, PDJA ii:167-184; The Jewish Agency Executive to the Government of Britain, 13 February 1947, doc. 64, Sagi, PDJA ii:192-196; Meeting: E. Bevin and Others - Members of the Jewish Agency Executive (London, 13 February 1947), 17 February, doc 72, Sagi, PDJA ii:213-222; Meeting: M. Shertok - T. Lie (4 March 1947), 5 March 1947, doc. 84, Sagi, PDJA ii:253-255.

[24] D. Ben-Gurion to Paula Ben-Gurion, 15 February 1947, doc. 70, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:210.

[25] Yegar, "Moshe Sharett and the Origins of Israel's Diplomacy," 5.

[26] Memorandum by W. Eytan, 25 February 1947, doc. 77, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:233.

[27] Memorandum by W. Eytan, 25 February 1947, doc. 77, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:234-236.

[28] Memorandum by W. Eytan, 25 February 1947, doc. 77, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:233-237.

[29] Question of Palestine - UK Delegation UN to Assistant Secretary-General of the UN, April 2, 1947, A/286, UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/181c4bf00c44e5fd85256cef0073c426/87aaa6be8a3a7015802564ad0037ef57?OpenDocumentb (17.06.2011).

[30] Resumé of a Consultation between N. Goldmann and E. Neumann, 8 April 1947, doc. 102, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:287-288; N. Goldmann to B. Locker, 10 April 1947, doc. 105, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:290-292; Minutes of Meeting American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 14 April, 14 April 1947, Z5/2361, CZA.

[31] Minutes of Meeting American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 14 April, 14 April 1947, Z5/2361, CZA.

[32] N. Goldmann to B. Locker, 10 April 1947, doc. 105, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:291.

[33] Abba Solomon Eban, *Abba Eban: An Autobiography* (Random House, 1977), 73.

[34] A. Eban to I.J. Linton, 26 April 1947, doc. 129, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:326-330. For the report in the tour to the Scandinavian countries see; Report by B. Locket, 2 May 1947, doc. 136,Sagi, *PDJA* ii:339-432.

[35] N. Goldmann to J.C. Smuts, 16 April 1947, doc. 111, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:300-301; J.C. Smuts to Ch. Weizmann, 29 May 1947, doc. 162, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:381.

[36] Report by M. Comay, 31 July 1947, doc. 232, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:495-497.

[37] M. Comay to W. Van Schalkwyk, 7 October 1947, doc. 368, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:706-708.

[38] L. Gelber to the Members of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive, doc. 323, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:658.

[39] Liberal Partition was a partition in which the Jews gained land "large enough to form the basis of a possible state." M. Comay to M. Shertok, 2 May 1947, doc. 135, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:334-339.

[40] L. Gelber to Members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 19 February 1947, doc. 73, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:223.

[41] Z. Sharef to M. Shertok, 13 April 1947, doc. 108, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:296-297.

[42] Minutes of Meeting American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 14 April, 14 April 1947, Z5/2361, CZA; Memorandum by the Jewish Agency Executive, 18 April 1947, doc. 117,Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:308; Meeting: O. Gass - D. Rusk, 6 May 1947, doc. 141, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:348-351.

[43] E. Epstein to Members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 8 August 1947, doc. 257, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:553.

[44] Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: American Section - 2 May, 2 May 1947, Z5/2360, CZA; Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: American Section - 5 May, 5 May 1947, Z5/2359, CZA.

[45] A. Lourie to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 7 May 1947, doc. 144, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:353; D. Acheson to M. Shertok, 13 May 1947, doc. 148, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:359; UN General Assembly, Seventy-fifth Plenary Meeting, doc. A/299, 5 May 1947, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/84A360CEA2AB2A4005256619005108EB (11.06.2011).

[46] Appearing to have a united voice was important in order to show that it was a national movement, representing a national body and not simply *one* representative of an ideology.

[47] Kaufman, *An ambiguous partnership*, 246-247; Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. American Section - 2 May, 2 May 1947, Z5/3428, CZA.

[48] Report by A. Eban, 14 May 1947, doc. 149, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:360; The word "independence" does not appear in the text: Question of Palestine: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly on the Report of the First Committee, 23 May 1947, A/309, UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/dbb84675de23a08f85256e67006f02cf?OpenDocument (10.06.2011); Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 165.

[49] Report by A. Eban, 14 May 1947, doc. 149,Sagi, *PDJA* ii:360-361; Minutes of meeting, American Section of the Executive Jewish Agency for Palestine, 16 May 1947, CZA, Z5/3509.

[50] Question of Palestine: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly on the Report of the First Committee, 23 May 1947, A/309, UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/dbb84675de23a08f85256e67006f02cf?OpenDocument (10.06.2011); Luard, A History of the United Nations, 165.

[51] Question of Palestine: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly on the Report of the First Committee, 23 May 1947, A/309, UN, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/eed216406b50bf6485256ce10072f637/dbb84675de23a08f85256e67006f02cf?OpenDocument (10.06.2011); Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: American Section - 8 May, 8 May 1948, Z5/2361, CZA.

[52] Minutes of the Meeting of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 10 March, 10 March 1947, Z5/3508, CZA; M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 3 April 1947, doc. 98, Sagi, PDJA ii:282; M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 4 April 1947, doc. 99, Sagi, PDJA ii:282-283; L. Lipsky to D. Acheson, 10 April 1947, doc. 104, Sagi, PDJA ii:289-290; N. Goldmann to B. Locker, 10 April 1947, doc. 105, Sagi, PDJA ii:290-292; Minutes of Meeting American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 14 April, 14 April 1947, Z5/2361, CZA; N. Goldmann to J.C. Smuts, 16 April 1947, doc. 111, Sagi, PDJA ii:300-301; M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 17 April 1947, doc. 115, Sagi, PDJA ii:305; N. Goldmann to J.C. Smuts, 16 April 1947, doc. 111, Sagi, PDJA ii:300-301; M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 17 April 1947, doc. 115, Sagi, PDJA ii:305; Memorandum by the Jewish Agency Executive, 18 April 1947, doc. 117,Sagi, PDJA ii:307-309; Meeting: O. Gass - D. Rusk, 6 May 1947, doc. 141,Sagi, PDJA ii:348-351.

[53] Minutes of the Meeting of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 10 March, 10 March 1947, Z5/3508, CZA.

[54] Henderson in Clifford, Feinberg, and Henderson, "Oral History Interview Clifford, Feinberg and Henderson", 1973, 119.

[55] See e.g. Min of meeting, ASEJAP, 16 May 1947, CZA, Z5/3509.

[56] Report by A. Eban, 14 May 1947, doc. 149, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:362; Min of meeting, ASEJAP, 16 May 1947, CZA, Z5/3509; M. Comay to M. Schenck, 12 June 1947, doc. 170,Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:394-397; Zubok, Vladislav, "The Soviet Union and the Establishment of Israel" in Devine, Watson, and Wolz, *Israel and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman*, 74-80.

[57] M. Comay to M. Schenck, 12 June 1947, doc. 170, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:394-397.

[58] Minutes of Meeting of the American Section of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 19 May, 19 May 1947, Z5/3509, CZA.

[59] Report by A. Eban, 14 May 1947, doc. 149, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:361; M. Comay to M. Shertok, 12 June 1947, doc. 170, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:394-397; E. Epstein to Members of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem, 20 June 1947, doc. 179, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:407-409.

[60] Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 165; Eban, *Abba Eban*, 76; Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 37.

[61] D. Ben-Gurion to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 15 June 1947, doc. 171, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:398-399. The Anglo-American Committee was a joint US-UK attempt to solve both the situation for Jews in Europe and the situation in Palestine.

[62] M.S. Comay to M. Shertok, 30 June 1947, doc. 190, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:426-428; W. Eytan to M. Shertok, 10 July 1947, doc. 199, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:435-437.

[63] W. Eytan to M. Shertok, 10 July 1947, doc. 199, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:435-437; M. Shertok to I.J. Linton, 11 July 1947, doc. 202, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:440; M. Shertok to E. Epstein, 17 July 1947, doc. 211,Sagi, *PDJA* ii :466; Ch. Berman to M. Sneh, 18 July 1947, doc. 212,Sagi, *PDJA* ii:467.

[64] See e.g. Memorandum by Ch. Yassky, 18 July 1947, Sagi, *PDJA*, ii:468-473.

[65] One should note that some individual Arab testimonies were given. Cunningham (Palestine) to Sec of State, 7 June 1947, FO371/61875, PRO; Jedda to FO, 12 June 1947, FO371/61875, PRO; Amman to FO, 25 June 25 1947, FO371/61875, PRO; Beirut to FO, 24 July 1947, FO371/61876, PRO; Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 165-166; Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 182.

[66] Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 182.

[67] Beirut to FO, 24 July 1947, FO371/61876, PRO; Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 182.

[68] Report by A. Eban, 4 August 1947, doc. 246, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:519.

[69] Meeting: M. Shertok and M. Kahany - H. Vigier, 8 August 1947, doc. 256, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:549-552.

[70] Eban, *Abba Eban*, 82.

[71] M. Kahany to M. Shertok, 28 July 1947, doc. 223, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:484-486; M. Shertok to the Chairman of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, 30 July 1947, doc. 226, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:488-489; G. Ruffer to Members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 2 August 1947, doc. 241, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:510-511.

[72] M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 30 July 1947, doc. 225 in Sagi, *PDJA* ii:488.

[73] M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 5 August 1947, doc. 251, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:528-532.

[74] A. Rabel and B. Teichholz to S. Adler-Rudel and G. Ruffer, 12 August 1947, doc. 261, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:560-561.

[75] M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 15 August 1947, doc. 271, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:573.

[76] Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 166-167; Morris, *Righteous Victims*, 183; Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 37-39.

[77] E. Epstein to D. Ben-Gurion and Members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 1 September 1947, doc. 299, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:615.

[78] Palestine: Report of the UNSCOP, 5 September 1947, FO371/61878, PRO.

[79] Walid Khalidi, "Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 27, no. 1 (1997): 16.

[80] D. Adelson to Members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 9 September 1947, doc. 313 in Sagi, *PDJA* ii:638-639.

[81] M. Sneh to the Jewish Agency Executive, 16 October 1947, doc. 385, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:730; M. Fischer to N. Goldman, 16 October 1947, doc. 387, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:732; M. Sneh to M. Shertok, 21 October 1947, doc. 396, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:744-745; N. Goldmann to M. Sneh, 23 October 1947, doc. 411, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:763-764; Sh. Meirov to M. Shertok, 25 October 1947, doc. 423, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:773-774; R. Nathan to J. Monnet, 29 October 1947, doc. 438, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:793 For documents about the link between the French vote and the Benelux' see N. Goldmann to M. Sneh, 23 October 1947, doc. 411, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:763-764; M. Comay to Z. Infeld, 20 October 1947, doc. 434, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:786-791.

[82] Report of a Telephone Message by E. Epstein, 17 November 1947, doc. 485, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:854-855; A. Eban to P. Pescatore, 23 November 1947, doc. 500, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:869-871.

[83] M. Sneh to M. Shertok, 15 September 1947, doc. 326, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:661-662.

[84] Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: American Section - 1 October, 1 October 1947, Z5/2369, CZA.

[85] Proceedings: A meeting of the Non-Zionist Organizations and the Jewish Agency - 26 October, 26 October 1947, Z5/2375, CZA.

[86] D. Ben-Gurion to Paula Ben-Gurion, 2 September 1947, doc. 304, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:619; D. Ben-Gurion to Paula Ben-Gurion, 4 September 1947, doc. 307, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:621-623; D. Adelson to Members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 8 September 1947, doc. 312, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:634-638; D. Adelson to Members of the Jewish Agency Executive, 9 September 1947, doc. 313, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:638-639; W. Eytan to G. Meyerson, 3 October 1947, doc. 360, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:698.

[87] D.R. Wahl to I.L. Kenen, 23 September 1947, doc. 339, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:676-677; M. Shertok to G. Meyerson, 25 September 1947, doc. 341, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:678.

[88] H.L. Shapiro to Chairmen of Local Emergency Committees, 1 October 1947, doc. 356, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:694.

[89] Kaufman, *An ambiguous partnership*, 261.

[90] Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine - 19 September, 19 September 1947, Z5/2364, CZA.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Quoted in Cheryl Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination* (University of Illinois Press, 1989), 31; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 89.

[93] Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 40.

[94] Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 60, 259.

[95] Meeting of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine: American Section - 1 October, 1 October 1947, Z5/2369, CZA; M. Yuval to D. Ben-Gurion, 23 October 1947, doc. 407, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:756-760; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 150-159; Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking, An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman* (Berkley Publishing Co., 1973), 215-216.

[96] A. Lourie to I.J. Linton, 2 October 1947, doc. 357, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:695.

[97] M.A. Halperin to A. Lourie, 4 November 1947, doc. 459, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:821. Loy Henderson had made the same point regarding the US pressuring the Latin American countries, see Proceedings: A meeting of the Non-Zionist Organizations and the Jewish Agency - 26 October, 26 October 1947, Z5/2375, CZA; See also Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 161.

[98] M. Comay to M., 18 October 1947, doc. 390, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:736.

[99] Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 170-172; Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine, 20th Meeting, Press Release, 22 October, 1947, FO371/61879, PRO.

[100] Z. Lifschitz to Z. Sharef, 24 October 1947, doc. 415, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:767-768; Proceedings: A meeting of the Non-Zionist Organizations and the Jewish Agency - 26 October, 26 October 1947, Z5/2375, CZA.

[101] Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question: Round-Up Covering the Period 23 September to 25 November 1947, 26 November 1947, http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1070488EB1EA83C1852577BA0063F90B (29.06.2011).

[102] W. Eytan to L. Gelber, 23 October 1947, doc. 408, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:761.

[103] W. Eytan to L. Gelber, 23 October 1947, doc. 408, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:760-761.

[104] B. Locker to C. Huysmans and L. de Brouckere, 22 October 1947, doc. 406, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:756.

[105] Record of a Telephone Message from I.J. Linton, 31 October 1947, doc. 450, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:810-811.

[106] See e.g. B. Locker to G. Rasmussen, 19 November 1947, doc. 491, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:860-861.

[107] I.J. Linton to A. Eban, 3 November 1947, doc. 453, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:813-814.

[108] This last point was especially true regarding the Eastern bloc.

[109] L. Gelber to Members of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive, 5 November 1947, doc. 462, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:826.

[110] Hilde Henriksen Waage, *Da staten Israel ble til: Et stridsspørsmål i norsk politikk 1945-49* (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1989), 80-81.

[111] James Barros, *Trygve Lie and the Cold War: The UN Secretary-General Pursues Peace, 1946-1953* (Northern Illinois University Press, 1989), 181-190.

[112] Abraham Rabinovich, "Intensely Lobbying the UN behind the scene, half a loaf by the Jerusalem Post", http://www.palestineremembered.com/Acre/Palestine-Remembered/Story780.html (21.07.2011).

[113] Ch. Weizmann to President Truman, 25 November 1947, doc. 506, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:877.

[114] Ch. Weizmann to President Truman, 25 November 1947, doc. 509, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:879-880.

[115] Ch. Weizmann to President Truman, 28 November 1947, doc. 523, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:889-890.

[116] Ch. Weizmann to A.E. Sassen, 25 November 1947, doc. 507, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:878.

[117] I.J. Linton to J.C. Smuts, 27 November 1947, doc. 518, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:885-886.

[118] Henderson in Clifford, Feinberg, and Henderson, "Oral History Interview Clifford, Feinberg and Henderson," 135-139; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 161.

[119] Quoted in Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 168.

[120] Quoted in Ibid., 169.

[121] Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 41; Alan R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy, 1897-1947* (Inst for Palestine Studies, 1970), 104-105.

[122] Taylor, *Prelude to Israel*, 104; Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East*, 41; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 169-170.

[123] Henderson in Clifford, Feinberg, and Henderson, "Oral History Interview Clifford, Feinberg and Henderson," 136-137; Kathleen Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy* (London: University of California Press, 2001), 72; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 169.

[124] Henderson in Clifford, Feinberg, and Henderson, "Oral History Interview Clifford, Feinberg and Henderson," 137; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 169.

[125] A/RES/181(II) of 29 November 1947, http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7f0af2bd897689b785256c330061d253 (14.06.2011).

[126] D. Ben-Gurion to Paula Ben-Gurion, 2 September 1947, doc. 304, Sagi, *PDJA* ii:619.

[127] Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 174-180; Barros, *Trygve Lie and the Cold War*, 182-191.

[128] Cunningham (Palestine) to FO, 3 December 1947, FO371/61890, PRO; FO to High Comm (Amman), 5 December 1947, FO816/111, PRO; Washington to Eastern Department, 8 December 1947, FO371/61892, PRO; UN del to FO, 9 January 1948, FO371/61893, PRO; Donald Neff, *Fallen Pillars: U.S. Policy Towards Palestine and Israel Since 1945*, (Inst for Palestine Studies, 2002), 52-59.

[129] Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World* (Penguin Books Ltd, 2001), 27.

[130] Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[131] Luard, *A History of the United Nations*, 176-178.

[132] Barros, *Trygve Lie and the Cold War*, 189-190.

[133] Ibid., 179-184.

[134] Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 188-198; Neff, *Fallen Pillars*, 60-61.

[135] Quoted in Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 193.

[136] Steven L. Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict: Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan* (University Of Chicago Press, 1986), 34; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 191, 204; Eban, *Abba Eban*, 110.

[137] Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, "President Truman's Decision to Recognize Israel," *The Jerusalem Viewpoints series*, May 1, 2008, No. 563, http://www.jcpa.org/JCPA/Templates/ShowPage.asp?DBID=1&LNGID=1&TMID=111&FID=376&PID=0&IID=2203 (19.07.2011); Clifford in Clifford, Feinberg, and Henderson, "Oral History Interview Clifford, Feinberg and Henderson," 95-106; Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 36-37; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 208-209, 212-214.

[138] Oral History Interview with Clark Clifford, 96-102, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/cliford.htm (21.07.2011); Kaufman, *An ambiguous partnership*, 355; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 211, 215.

[139] Neff, *Fallen Pillars*, 64.

[140] Wm. Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), 514-515; Cohen, *Truman and Israel*, 220-221; Benson, *Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel*, 168.

[141] Enclosure in Jedda un-numbered letter, 4 September 1948, FO371/68641, PRO.

[142] Epstein to Shertok, 14 May 1948, RG/130/MFA/2308/6, ISA.

[143] Christison, *Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy*, 72.

[144] List of recognitions of Israel, 8 December 1949, FO371/82516, PRO.

[145] Commonwealth Relations Office to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, 16 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; South Africa to Commonwealth Relations Office, 19 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; South Africa to Commonwealth Relations Office, 19 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; South Africa to Commonwealth Relations Office, 21 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; Commonwealth Relations Office to South Africa, 23 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; South Africa to Commonwealth Relations Office, 24 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; South Africa to Commonwealth Relations Office, 24 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; List of recognitions of Israel, 8 December 1949, FO371/82516, PRO.

[146] Commonwealth Relations Office to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, 16 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; New Zealand to Commonwealth Relations Office, 21 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; Commonwealth Relations Office to New Zealand, 23 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; Commonwealth Relations Office to New Zealand, 28 May 1948, PREM8/861, PRO; Commonwealth Relations Office to Australia, 6 June 1948, PREM8/861, PRO.

[147] List of recognitions of Israel, 8 December 1949, FO371/82516, PRO.

[148] Ibid.

[149] Quoted in Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest*, 39.

[150] It has been noted elsewhere that this step-by-step approach was central in Ben-Gurions's political thinking. The term "gradualism" is often used. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel*, 109-110; Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited*, 2004), 138-139; Khalidi, "Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution," 6-7, 17.

[151] Quoted in Rubenberg, *Israel and the American National Interest*, 29.