The US may become trapped in its own escalation

In just over one week, the US, together with Israel, has struck over 3,000 targets in Iran and dropped thousands of bombs. Yet it remains unclear what the US is actually trying to achieve with the war.

If the goal is regime change in Tehran, both history and research give little reason to believe that an air war alone can accomplish it. The administration has justified the strikes with everything from Iran’s nuclear program and missile arsenal to its navy and military capacity. At the same time, President Trump has stated that he wants to “crush the regime in Iran” and that the war can only end with Iran’s "unconditional surrender.”

Political scientist Robert Pape at the University of Chicago has studied the effects of strategic bombing for several decades. His conclusion is clear: airstrikes can destroy military targets effectively, but have never alone been sufficient to force regime change. He warns against what he calls “the smart bomb trap”—the notion that precision weapons can make air war a strategically decisive instrument in itself.

Even when the bombs hit their targets, they do not solve the political problem the war is really about. Airstrikes can destroy military installations, but not necessarily the regime’s power structure or its ability to reorganize. In the case of Iran, this particularly concerns the question of where the stockpiles of highly enriched uranium are located.

This creates a strategic dilemma: the strikes may be tactically successful, but simultaneously leave uncertainty about what still exists. When this uncertainty persists, pressure mounts to strike again. This is the dynamic Pape describes as an escalation trap.

A conflict that spreads

Just one week after the US and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes against Iran on February 28, the conflict has already produced significant regional repercussions.

Iran has responded with extensive drone and missile attacks against American bases in the Gulf and Israeli targets. At the same time, energy infrastructure in the region has been hit, including in the financial centers of Dubai and Abu Dhabi—cities built on stability, trade, and capital flows. Oil prices have risen sharply, and traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important shipping lanes for oil, has been partially halted.

Iran cannot win a conventional war against the US. A more realistic strategy is therefore to increase the costs of the conflict for the region. By striking energy and trade infrastructure, Iran can pressure its neighbors—particularly the Arab Gulf states—to work politically for a rapid de-escalation.

The limitations of airpower

Historical experience illustrates the limitations of airpower. During World War II, bombing helped weaken Germany, but the war was only decided when Allied ground forces took control of territory. In Vietnam, the US conducted massive bombing campaigns for nearly a decade without achieving its political objectives.

More recent conflicts show similar patterns. The NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 is often cited as an example of successful airpower, but the outcome was also due to diplomatic pressure and a credible threat of a NATO invasion. In Libya in 2011, airstrikes only became decisive when combined with rebel forces on the ground.

In research at PRIO and the University of Oslo, we find a similar pattern in the war against the Islamic State in Syria: airstrikes contributed to ISIS losing territory, but only when combined with forces on the ground.

Asymmetric advantages

The ongoing conflict in Iran also has a clear asymmetric dimension. Iran relies heavily on cheap drones and relatively simple missiles to attack targets in the region. Defending against such attacks, however, requires expensive air defense systems. An interceptor missile can cost millions of dollars, while an attack drone can be produced for a fraction of the price.

Over time, this cost asymmetry can make an air war economically burdensome even for militarily superior states. At the same time, reports suggest that the high consumption of interceptor missiles is already straining Western stockpiles. The American administration has therefore asked the defense industry to increase production.

Robust resistance

Just a few weeks before the war began, Iran experienced the largest protests since the 1979 revolution. Millions demonstrated against the regime in over a hundred cities. The authorities responded with extensive violence: thousands of protesters were killed and many more arrested. The discontent with the authoritarian regime is therefore real and widespread.

Authoritarian regimes can often withstand significant military pressure. Leadership can be replaced, organizations can be reorganized, and nationalist mobilization can strengthen the regime’s legitimacy when the country is attacked from the outside. Pape also points out that airstrikes can alter the political dynamics within the country: the regime and critical segments of society may come closer together under external pressure, as resistance to the external attacker increases. This can weaken the possibility of the regime being challenged from within.

Iran is a state with a complex power structure. The Revolutionary Guards function as a parallel security apparatus designed precisely to ensure regime survival in crisis situations. Even successful attacks on military installations or leaders will therefore not necessarily lead to political change.

The risk of a prolonged war

The Gulf states depend on stability for trade, investment, and energy exports. When shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is threatened and energy infrastructure is attacked, it creates uncertainty far beyond the region.

The US has so far avoided ground forces, although Trump has not ruled it out. An alternative strategy could be to support local groups that can operate inside Iran. Kurdish opposition groups in northern Iraq have already signaled that they are considering operations across the border.

Such a development carries significant risks. The involvement of Kurdish militias could quickly expand the conflict to Iraq and mobilize Iran-backed Shia militias. At the same time, Kurdish groups have their own political goals, including those related to autonomy, which do not necessarily align with the broader Iranian opposition.

US security commitments to Israel further complicate the situation. If the US deescalates without being sure that Iran’s military capacity has been weakened, the risk of new attacks on Israel could increase.

The escalation trap is also political. Attempts in Congress to limit the war under the War Powers Act have so far failed. When the objective is simultaneously framed as regime change and “unconditional surrender,” anything short of total victory can be portrayed as defeat—creating pressure for further escalation.

Airstrikes and precision weapons can be militarily effective. But they alone do not bring about regime change or resolve the political conflicts the war is really about.

The result may be a war in which the costs of continuing rise, while it becomes increasingly difficult to end.

In such an escalation dynamic, it is not only states that pay the price. Even precision weapons strike civilians, and the longer the conflict lasts, the greater the human costs.

The authors

• Andreas Forø Tollefsen, Associate Professor, Human Geography at the University of Oslo and Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
• Scott Gates, Professor, Political Science at the University of Oslo
• Chandler Williams, Doctoral Research Fellow at PRIO
• Mikael Naghizadeh, Researcher at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies
  This text was published in Norwegian by Aftenposten 11 March 2026